Traffic accidents are one of the leading causes of injury and death in the U.S. The role of traffic law enforcement in the reduction of accidents has been studied by relatively few papers and with mixed results that may be due to a simultaneity problem. Traffic law enforcement may reduce accidents, but police are also likely to be stricter in accidentprone areas. We use municipal budgetary shortfalls as an instrumental variable to identify the effect of traffic citations on traffic safety and show that budgetary shortfalls lead to more frequent issuance of tickets to drivers. Using a panel of municipalities in Massachusetts, we show that increases in the number of tickets written reduce motor vehicle accidents and accident related injuries. The findings show that failure to control for endogeneity results in a significant underestimation of the positive impact of law enforcement on traffic safety. 
I. Introduction
Traffic accidents remain one of the leading causes of injury and death in the United States. Placed in a public health context, motor vehicle accidents are the 9 th leading cause of death in the United States, with a mortality rate of 15.3 per 100,000 population (Heron 2007; Miniño et al. 2007 ). The average driver has a one in fifteen chance of being involved in a traffic accident during a given year.
1 A wide range of social scientists, including economists, has long studied the efficacy of policies, such as speed limits and mandatory seat belt use, intended to improve traffic safety. 2 The impact of these policies, however, is contingent on the enforcement of their associated laws and relatively few papers examine the effect of law enforcement on automobile accidents (McCarthy 1999; Redelmeier et al. 2003) .
Rational choice predicts that as officers issue more tickets to drivers operating in violation of the law, drivers respond to the increasing cost of breaking the law by driving more safely. 3 This model predicts that ticketing leads to fewer motor vehicle accidents. 4 However, to date there is little evidence on whether and by how much enforcement reduces accidents. Only a handful of studies address this issue. Using data from Canada, Redelmeier et al. (2003) , found a negative short term effect of traffic citation on the likelihood of being involved which vanished after three months. These authors'
1 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Traffic Safety Facts Report, 2001 . 2 These policies include mandatory seat belt use (Loeb 1995) , air bags (Kneuper and Yandle 1994; Levitt and Porter 2001) , the speed limit (Forester et al. 1984) , motorcycle helmet laws (Jones and Bayer 2007) , the drinking age (Asch and Levy 1990) , and vehicle safety inspections (Merrell et al. 1999) . 3 Rational choice models predict that the levels of enforcement and punishment for traffic violations are based on the degree of infringement by the offending party, the marginal returns to local safety, and the costs of enforcement (Becker 1968; Lee 1985; Polinsky and Shavell 1992; Ehrlich 1996) . 4 In a survey conducted by Williams et al.(1995) asking drivers how different factors motivated them to practice safe driving habits, 61 percent of respondents said concern that they may receive a traffic fines motivated them "a lot," ranking only behind potential accidents (82 percent) and potential increase in insurance premiums (63 percent).
simultaneous determination of accidents and citations may have led them to underestimate of the effect (p. 2181). McCarthy (1999) found that traffic arrests are negatively correlated with fatal accidents. More recent innovations in enforcement, such as red light and speed cameras, as well as driver intoxication checkpoints have also been studied (for a review of this literature, see Blais and Dupont 2005) .
Results of existing studies on the effects of law enforcement have been called into question because they have not satisfactorily addressed the issue that enforcement and traffic accidents are simultaneously determined (Elvik 2002; Blais and Dupont 2005) . For example, while stricter enforcement may reduce accidents, stricter enforcement may also be a response to higher accidents rates. That is, officers issue more fines in cities and in pockets of time identified with unsafe driving behavior and higher accident rates. In this case, ordinary least square estimation will not identify a causal effect of enforcement on accidents. Not controlling for the simultaneous determination of enforcement and accidents leads to a biased estimate, and thus an underestimation of the effect of enforcement.
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To examine the effect of traffic law enforcement on accidents we use a panel of municipality level monthly traffic accident and traffic stop data in over 300 towns in
Massachusetts. We study a 21 months period, between 2001 and 2003. We control for omitted variables with month and municipality fixed effects and address the concern of time varying omitted variables with instrumental variable estimation. Our instrument is the financial health of a town, measured by whether a town asks voters to approve a property tax override referendum. An override referendum allows towns to collect property tax revenues beyond Massachusetts legal limits established by Proposition 2 ½ in 1980. By putting an override referendum in front of voters, the town board indicates that the town is in fiscal distress and that they would like to raise additional revenue.
When towns are in a fiscal distress, government officials have an incentive to seek extra revenues not only through an increase in property taxes, but also by increasing fines. One potential source of fines are traffic tickets. We document that when towns seek extra revenues through override referenda, police officers in that town issue more traffic fines and that our instrument has a statistically significant impact on traffic tickets.
When using instrumental variables to identify causal relationships, validity of the instrument is always a concern. While it is unlikely that fiscal distress has a direct effect on traffic accidents, there are reasons for some concern. For example, Ruhm (2000) shows a positive correlation between recessions and several positive health outcomes. We address potential endogeneity issues through both a variety of control variables and the use of alternative instruments. We find our key results to be robust to a variety of model and instrument specifications.
When the fiscal situation is tight, fines exacted on drivers from out of town make an especially appealing source of additional revenue because they do not vote in local elections. Because municipalities are small in Massachusetts, many drivers are out of town drivers. The median town area is only 20.5 square miles and over 78 percent of all accidents involve an out of town driver. This makes it possible to test the sensitivity of our instrument to alternative specifications while controlling for the direct effect of fiscal conditions on accidents via the override indicator. This alternative instrument is the number of stopped out of town drivers in cities experiencing fiscal distress. 6 We find that in towns with fiscal distress police officers issue more tickets to out of town drivers.
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Since it seems reasonable to assume that the interaction of out of town drivers stopped and local fiscal distress does not directly affect accidents, the interaction represents a suitable instrument.
We demonstrate that the OLS estimator reveals a positive correlation between tickets and crashes. OLS estimation including town and month fixed effects shows a negative correlation between tickets and crashes. Adding instrumental variable estimation, using the Proposition 2 ½ related instruments, we document that tickets reduce car crashes and that the magnitude of this effect is nearly three times larger than in the OLS estimation. Further, we document that more enforcement reduces injuries and associated with traffic accidents. Results regarding fatalities show a negative correlation with enforcement, but are less conclusive.
II. Background on Institutions and Officer Strictness
In 1980 Massachusetts voters passed referendum Proposition 2 ½, which placed limits on both the maximum amount of revenue generated through property taxation by
Massachusetts municipalities and the amount by which any municipality may increase 6 Massachusetts provides for a invaluable setting for our study not just because of the Proposition 2 ½ budget institution, but also because of its 351 municipalities dividing what is, at 10,000 square miles, the 6 th smallest state in the United States, into local towns with a median area of only 20.5 square miles. As a result, there is a relatively small radius from a driver's home (approximately 2.5 miles for a resident of the median town) that he or she is actually driving "in town." In our two years of traffic stops (including stops that result in tickets and those that do not), 63% of all stopped drivers are not local residents. A recent survey by Progressive Auto Insurance of 11,000 policyholders found that 77% of accidents happened more than two miles from their customer's home (Insurance.com 2007) , which in Massachusetts would place the bulk of accident participants outside of their home municipality. 7 These results are consistent with other recent work showing that towns in financial decline use traffic tickets as a revenue generation tool (Helland and Tabarrok 2002; Makowsky and Stratmann 2008). this revenue from one year to the next. If a town government wishes to raise funds from property taxes beyond the levy limit prescribed by Proposition 2 ½, it has the option to pass an "override" referendum, which allows additional revenue to be raised for the following fiscal year. An override referendum can be proposed and placed on an electoral ballot by a majority vote of the town board of selectmen (aldermen). A referendum can be held at anytime during the year. In our data, referenda occur at a higher frequency in the spring, but they are held almost all times of the year. The override question must be presented in dollar terms and specify the purpose of the additional funds. Passage of the override requires a majority vote of approval by the electorate (Massachusetts
Department of Revenue 2001).
A passed referendum will raise the property tax revenue raised in the subsequent fiscal year, which begins July 1 st and runs through June 31 st of the following calendar year.
Evidence suggests that while limits on personal property taxation have curtailed spending (Cutler et al. 1999; Bradbury et al.) , they have also made Massachusetts local governments more dependent on other local sources of revenues. 8 Galles and Sexton (1998) 10 Some municipalities choose to recover only direct costs, while others include "indirect" costs as well, such as administrative and debt management costs. 11 "Fines imposed under the provisions of chapters eighty-nine and ninety, including fines, penalties and assessments imposed under the provisions of chapter ninety C for the violation of the provisions of chapters eighty-nine and ninety, fines assessed by a hearing officer of a city or town as defined in sections twenty A and twenty A 1/2 of chapter ninety and forfeitures imposed under the provisions of section one hundred and forty-one of chapter one hundred and forty, shall be paid over to the treasury of the city or town wherein the offense was committed; provided, however, that only fifty per cent of the amount of fines, penalties and assessments collected for violations of section seventeen of chapter ninety or of a special speed regulation lawfully made under the authority of section eighteen of said chapter ninety shall be paid over to the treasury of the city or town wherein the offense was committed and the remaining fifty per cent shall be paid over to the state treasurer and credited to the Highway Fund. "(Massachusetts State Law. Part IV, Title II, Chapter 280, Section 2.)
Officers have the discretion to issue a warning, which carries neither a fine nor points for the driver's record. 12, 13 Makowsky and Stratmann (2009) show in a crosssection that failure to pass an override referendum increases officer strictness. 14 In these towns, officers issue fewer warnings and more tickets to out of town drivers. Officers can exercise this discretion because in Massachusetts it is up to an officer's judgment whether to issue a fine or a warning for traffic infractions. For example, when a police officer stops a driver for driving in excess of the speed limit, the officer is not obligated to issue the driver a citation and a fine.
III. Data and Empirical Methods
The Massachusetts legislature required the collection of data from traffic stops Makowsky and Stratmann (2008) show this in a cross section for a two month period across 350 municipalities. These findings are consistent with the results by Garrett and Wagner (2008) who find that officers in North Carolina issue more tickets in the year after a decline in county revenue. 15 In this data set warnings are not explicitly labeled and we categorize all observations with a fine of zero dollars as warnings. These observations account for 46 percent of observations, similar to 48 percent warning rate observed in a subset of the data wherein warnings are explicitly labeled. Table 1 gives descriptive statistics for the data. In our data set there are on average 37 car accidents per month per town, ranging from zero accidents during a month in a few towns to 674 in Worcester in the month of October 2001. All recorded accidents 17 We also could have collapse the data to quarters or weeks. However, we have two incomplete quarters, and using a month as a unit of observation allows us to have complete data for each observation. Further, when using months instead of weeks, we have fewer zeros in the dependent variables, and thus the month unit makes ordinary least squares a defensible estimation method.
involve at least one automobile. For 409 observations, or less than 6 percent of the observations the traffic accident variable has a value of zero. The injury variable equals zero for 16 percent of the sample used, fatalities equals zero for 90 percent. On average, police officers issued 82 tickets per municipality, per month, with zero tickets recorded in less than one percent of the sample.
The override failure variable takes the value of one for 2.4 percent of the sample, and includes 18 of the 338 towns included in the sample. The override pass variable takes the value of one for 9 percent of the sample, representing 69 of all towns analyzed.
Towns where all referenda failed asked for an average total of $1,3 million, while towns where all referenda passed received an average of $1 million.
We use two measures for traffic law enforcement: the sum of tickets issued by local officers that are related to traffic safety and the sum of tickets issued per mile of local (non-highway) road. 18 Parking tickets, for example, are not included in this data set. Table A1 in the appendix shows the types of violations that resulted in a ticket. The most commonly issued tickets are for speeding, comprising 39 percent of all tickets. The next most common are tickets issued for seat belt violations (13 percent) and failure to stop (12 percent). 18 We focus on local officers because of our instrumental variable strategy: local officers have an incentive to react to a budgetary shortfall of the municipality because they are employed by the town, while state troopers are employed by the state. Local roads are all roads within the municipal boundaries excluding highways, which are the jurisdiction of Massachusetts state troopers.
of tickets reaches its maximum. This maximum is not due to any one town issuing many tickets in that month, but instead reflects a uniform increase in ticketing in all towns.
To control for other factors that affect car accidents, besides tickets, we estimate the regression
(1) Accidents it = β 0 + β 1 Tickets it + β 2 StoppedDrivers it + β 3 MunicipalityX it +
Municipality i + Month t + ε it
The accidents and tickets variables in equation (1) measure how many traffic crashes and tickets were recorded in municipality i during month t. Depending on the specification, accidents is either the number of crashes or the number of crashes per mile of local road. The vector StoppedDrivers it includes the number of stopped drivers from out of town, and their characteristics, that is, the number of stopped drivers that are minority drivers, female drivers, the average age of a stopped driver, and the average speed that was recorded on the ticket or warning issued when the driver was stopped for driving in excess of the limit, and the number of drivers stopped at night. Our measure of fiscal distress is whether a town puts an override referendum in front of voters, whether it failed or passed, and the dollar amount requested in the referenda. A referendum can be held at anytime during the year. In our data referenda occur at a higher frequency in the spring, but they are held at almost all times of the year.
The wording of the referendum has to be specific in that it says how much money is
requested and for what purpose the money will be used. Further, the referendum always applies to the following fiscal year. likely to pass and therefore may ask for only a fraction of their desired amounts in the referendum. Regardless of whether an override passes or fails, larger dollar amount requests indicate greater fiscal distress, suggesting that the estimated coefficient on the dollar amounts of passed and failed override referenda will be positive.
In the second stage regression, the first stage controls for town specific characteristics via town fixed effects. Therefore, the effect of override referenda is identified by changes in whether a town asked for tax increases through referenda.
Failure to approve an override referendum may affect traffic accidents via other avenues than tickets. Towns where a referendum fails may shift funds from street maintenance or other projects related to public safety to other areas. Worse street maintenance, pedestrian pathways, or public signage, could lead to an increase in accidents. To address this issue
we control in our regression for spending on road maintenance and other public safety spending. 23 To the extent that these variables do not control for all road maintenance activities, there will be a bias against a finding that more enforcement reduces traffic accidents.
The most serious concern in our model is that fiscal distress is correlated with ε it in (1) and thus that fiscal distress is correlated with driver behavior. For example, Ruhm (2000) finds that many population health outcomes improve during a recession. While he does not examine the relationship between government budgets and driver behavior, he does identify a negative relationship between the unemployment rate and the number of traffic accident related fatalities. Economic intuition would suggest that unemployed individuals would be driving less (absent a job to drive to) and might be more careful when they drove, being less able to "afford" the cost of a traffic accident. The correlation between budgetary shortfalls and unemployment is of course imperfect, but enough to warrant concern, particularly when fiscal distress reflects a distinctly local economic event (such as the closing of a major employer). We address this potential source of endogeneity two ways. where we now interact the Override vector with the number of stopped out of town drivers. Stopped out of town drivers are drivers whose license plate and drivers' license indicates that they are from out of town. It is a count of the number of stopped out of town drivers. Some of these drivers have received a ticket, and others a warning.
As such, we can control for the correlation of fiscal distress and traffic accidents in the second stage, while still identifying the relationship between tickets and accidents using the increase in tickets written to out of town drivers motivated by revenue needs. When the fiscal situation is tight, municipal governments can turn to out of town drivers for increasing town revenues by increasing the probability of a fine for stopped out of town drivers (Makowsky and Stratmann 2009) . Being from out of town, these drivers are less connected to local economic conditions, and their driving behavior is less likely to correlate to local economic conditions.
In our data set, the bulk of drivers on a given stretch of road in Massachusetts are from out of town. For the time period that we examine in this paper, out of town drivers represent sixty-six percent of drivers stopped, and sixty-nine percent of drivers issued tickets. 24 There is also some direct evidence out of town drivers are involved in the majority of car crashes. For a sub-period of our data set, from January 1, 2002 through January 31, 2003 we have data on whether a driver who is involved in an accident is from out of town. Earlier data, that is data for the first nine months of our data set, are not
available. 25 Table A2 shows that between January 2002 and January 2003 the number of accidents by out of town drivers is roughly proportional to the number of tickets to out of town drivers, and that out of town drivers are involved in the vast majority of accidents.
Seventy-eight percent of all accidents had at least one driver involved who was from out of town. Thus, increasing strictness on out of town drivers is in fact an increase in strictness on drivers who are primarily involved in crashes.
To test for the sensitivity of results to the measurement of the dependent variable, in a second set of specifications we measure the dependent variable as "crashes per miles of local road" where local roads constitute all roads within municipal boundaries excluding highways, which are the jurisdiction of state troopers. In these specifications, 24 The prevalence of out of town drivers is also increased by our exclusion of Boston, whose population density far exceeds the rest of the state. Only 13% of drivers stopped in our sample are from out of state. Out of state drivers represent a slightly different set of circumstances because they can, potentially, be identified by an officer prior to a stop by their out of state license plate. 25 According to the Massachusetts Department of Highway Traffic Engineering, the accident records computer system used prior to 2002 did not contain the residence of drivers.
all appropriate independent variables, including tickets, are measured per local mile. 26 As an additional robustness check, we ran the basic first stage specifications with a "placebo instrument." Tickets written by local officers are hypothesized to increase with local fiscal distress, while tickets written within municipal boundaries by state troopers should not Table 2 shows the effect of our measures for fiscal distress on the number of tickets issued. The dependent variable in the first two columns is the number of tickets, and the dependent variable in the next two columns is tickets per mile. We employ two different instrument specifications of our first stage. Column 1 includes only the override dummies and the override dollar amount variables. Column 2 includes both the original set of override variables and the additional interaction variables with out of town drivers stopped. Columns 3 and 4 reflect columns 1 and 2, but with tickets and the appropriate control variables measured per mile. All regressions have month and town fixed effects, and we cluster standard errors at the town level.
IV. Results
The coefficients on the override related variables in Table 2 , column 1 largely support the primary hypothesis behind our identification strategy. The number of tickets written is increasing with a failed referendum and decreasing with a passed referendum.
Further, the number of tickets is increasing with the dollar amounts of both passed and failed referendums. The point estimate on the passage of an override referendum shows that passage leads to a drop in the number of tickets written by 14.6 tickets, but that with each $100,000 increase in the amount asked for in the referendum, another 1.8 tickets are
written. This implies that a passed override referendum leads to fewer tickets when the amount asked for was below $555,000 and that the number of tickets issued increases for higher amounts. 27 In our data sample, 38 percent of observations with passed referendum were for requests in excess of $555,000, and thus resulted in additional tickets being issued.
While the positive coefficient on OverrideFail it, $OverrideFail it , and $OverridePass it is in line with our predictions, the negative sign on OverridePass it is different than expected. The total effect of a passed override with a large price tag, when considering coefficients on both OverridePass it and $OverridePass it , however, is consistent with our hypothesis. The results in column 1 suggest that passage of overrides requesting large dollar amounts, indicating significant fiscal distress, lead to more tickets issued. Smaller passed overrides, however, alleviate the fiscal pressure to pursue alternative revenues, and in turn correspond to fewer tickets. (Stock et al. 2002) . The Anderson-Rubin null hypothesis that the excluded variables coefficients equal zero can be rejected at the 2 and 7 percent level in the primary IV specifications and at the 9 and 11 percent level in the per mile measured IV. First stage results using state trooper issued tickets as a "placebo instrument failed to identify increases in state trooper tickets. The first stage specification using Override it and the alternative specification using Outtown it * Override it resulted in Kleibergen-Paap F statistics of 2.0 and 0.25. This lends further credence to our hypothesis that tickets specifically issued by officers employed by local government are connected to local fiscal distress and the efforts to raise revenues. The fixed effects specification does not control for the possibility that dangerous behavior ebbs and flows within a municipality, and that law enforcement responds accordingly. If changes in dangerous behavior within a town lead to more tickets and more accidents, then the coefficient in column 2 is biased upward. Columns 3 of Table 3 addresses this concern by using the instruments and first stage presented in The results in column 3 show that, as predicted, the magnitude of the coefficient on tickets increases when addressing the endogeneity concerns via instrumental variables.
Relative to OLS, the coefficient on tickets triples, and suggests that 100 extra tickets lead to 12.3 fewer car crashes. The results from this 2SLS model imply that a one standard deviation increase in tickets leads to a reduction of accidents by 26 percent of the standard deviation of accidents. We employ our alternative instrument specification, that is the Outtown it * Override it interaction variables, in our IV analysis in Table 3 , column 4. The results are very similar to those found in column 3. The coefficient on tickets is negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The magnitude is greater, suggesting that 100 extra tickets would lead to 16.1 fewer accidents. Unlike the model that does not measure accidents per mile, the 2SLS specification with
Outtown it * Override it interaction variables (column 8) shows a slightly lower magnitude, with 100 extra tickets correlating to 8.6 fewer accidents, but with a similar standard error.
The coefficient on tickets per local mile in column 8 is only significant at the 15 percent level.
Tables 4 and 5 include the analysis of injuries and fatalities. Injuries and fatalities are measure of the severity of accidents. Similar to the results with accidents, the OLS estimate without municipality fixed effects shows a positive coefficient on tickets with injuries (Table 4 , column 1), but the sign reverses and becomes negative and statistically significant when adding municipality fixed effects (Table 4 , column 2). The two IV estimates show a negative effect of tickets on the number of injuries that is statistically significant at the 15 percent (Table 4 , columns 3) and 5 percent level (column 4). The coefficient on tickets in the injury regression doubles from the OLS specification in column 2 to the instrumental variable specification in column 3 in Table 4 . The IV specification using the Outtown it interaction variables as the excluded instrumental variables (column 4) indicates that 100 additional tickets lead to 6 fewer injuries associated with traffic accidents. This implies that a one standard deviation in tickets reduces injuries by 27 percent of a standard deviation in injuries. Columns 5 and 6 in Table 4 represent the per mile measured specifications for injuries. Neither specification results in statistically significant coefficients on tickets per mile.
In Table 5 , columns 1 and 2, tickets are not statistically significant in either specification for fatalities. Because only a relatively small fraction of the sample has zeroes for accidents and injuries, we estimated the accident and injury models using OLS.
Because the fraction of observations with zero fatalities (90 percent) is large we also estimated the regression using a Poisson model. Poisson estimation with month and municipal fixed effects (column 3) yields a negative coefficient on tickets with a relatively large standard error that is not statistically significant. The IV estimates for fatalities are sensitive to the instrument specification. Both IV estimates of the tickets coefficient are negative (columns 4 and 5), but only the result that is based on the first stage where we use the Outtown it interaction variables as the excluded instrument is statistically significant. Columns 6 and 7 in Table 5 represent the per mile measured specifications for fatalities. Neither specification results in statistically significant coefficients on tickets per mile.
The coefficients on unemployment filings in our IV analysis of automobile accidents are positive with accidents and negative in accidents per mile, but are not statistically significant with either. Conversely, the coefficient on unemployment is negative and statistically significant with both injuries and injuries per mile, in strong concurrence with the findings of Ruhm (2000) .
The model results show that tickets are an effective means for reducing accidents and injuries, while the effect of ticket issuance on fatalities is inconclusive. This is likely, in part, because car accidents may result in injuries, but whether they result in fatalities as opposed to a serious injury has greater element of randomness to it, and may require a larger sample over a longer period of time to find statistically significant effects.
Fatalities may also be more dependent on driver specific factors, such as whether the driver was wearing a seat belt, for which we are unable to control.
V. Conclusion
This paper shows that traffic fines reduce the number of car accidents and related injuries. We address the endogeneity problem that remains after using town and time effects by estimating the fixed effects model with instrumental variables. Our instrument is whether a town asked for more money through an override referendum and its interaction with stopped out of town drivers. Using panel data, we find that more tickets are issued when a town has asked for an override referendum, and that tickets issuance increase the more out of town drivers that are stopped, lending support to the tax exporting hypothesis while controlling for town fixed effects. Using these estimates, we find that tickets are a far more effective reducer of car accidents and automobile accident related injuries than ordinary least square estimation would indicate. The results from this 2SLS model imply that a one standard deviation increase in tickets leads to a reduction of accidents by a third of the standard deviation of accidents.
We have not discussed specific mechanisms for tickets to reduce accidents in this paper beyond the basic rational choice story that traffic fines increase the price of unsafe driving, leading to less consumption of unsafe driving and fewer accidents. While there is no doubt a variety of stories that can be told to add nuance to this standard economic logic, some relate more directly to our data and their specific social setting. An increase in ticket writing behavior during a particularly tight fiscal year might quickly give a town's officers a reputation for strictness. First or second hand stories of speed traps or towns "looking to raise money" can spread quickly. When local news affiliates in Massachusetts air stories of the upcoming referendum vote in a neighboring town, drivers may take note to drive more conservatively within its jurisdiction. Before reputations are made, however, additional tickets may improve traffic safety by changing the subjective probability of future tickets, and thus the behavior, of their recipients. While tickets are given to a very small proportion of drivers, they are more likely to be given to the most reckless drivers. Changing their behavior would have a disproportionate effect on traffic safety. 87 N = 7,038. Robust standard errors, clustered by municipality, in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Town and month fixed effect include 338 municipalities and 21 individually coded months. The first stage for columns 3, 4, 7, and 8 are, respectively, columns 1,2,3, and 4 from Table 2. All variables denoted with a †are measured per mile of local road in columns 5 through 8. 91 N = 7,038. Robust standard errors, clustered by municipality, in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Town and month fixed effect include 338 municipalities and 21 individually coded months. The first stage for columns 3, 4, 5, and 6 are, respectively, columns 1,2,3, and 4 from Table 2. All variables denoted with a †are measured per mile of local road in columns 5 and 6. The first stage for columns 4, 5, 6, and 7 are, respectively, columns 1,2,3, and 4 from Table 2. All variables denoted with a †are measured per mile of local road in columns 5 and 6. 
